making facility. With the experience of India and Turkey in mind, a World Bank study team in the 1960s "expressed the view that an integrated steel mill in Korea was a premature proposition without economic feasibility" (Pohang Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., 1984, p. 23) . A study of the trade regime in effect in Korea in 1968 concluded that most of the steel being made was "prominent among the inefficiently produced import-competing products . . . " (Westphal and Kim, 1982) . Thus, Korea faced several challenges in entering the steel business (in addition to those associated with World Bank hostility): Integrated iron-and steel-making is highly capital intensive, but Korea lacked capital. Costs are sensitive to scale, but Korea's domestic market was small and the largest nearby market, Japan, lodged the world's most efficient steel producer. Korea lacked iron ore resources and was located far from the main sources of supply. Finally, Korea lacked steelmaking skills. As is typical of many mature industries, the steel-making process is embodied in the equipment. The process technology is well diffused (except for very high quality specialty steels) and can easily be imported at arm's length from machinery suppliers and from technical consultants. Nonetheless, the nature of the process necessitates complex engineering. For example, of a sample of nineteen industries in the United States in 1970, iron and steel ranked tenth in engineering intensity (measured by number of engineers in total employment) (Zymelman, 1980) . In spite of all these obstacles, the Pohang Iron and Steel Company, Ltd., familiarly referred to as POSCO, became one of the lowest-cost steel-makers in the world. An ironic indicator of the speed of its progress was a joint venture it entered into with United States Steel (USX) in 1986 for the purpose of modernizing USX's Pittsburg, California, plant. At that time POSCO was supplying half of the capital (p.292) requirements, or $180 million, for the modernizationproviding the PittCal cold-rolled sheet facility with hot-bend coil, undertaking basic design of the facility's modernization jointly with USX, and training American managers and workers in operations and maintenance. Thus, less than twenty years after its founding, POSCO was exporting technology.
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The dynamics of comparative advantage suggested by Korean steel-making, therefore, are those of overcoming obstacles to create advantage, of rejecting the current endowment of resources as arbiter of how income is to be earned in the future. Creating competitiveness in late industrialization amounts to taking the risk of deciding what skills, on the part of individuals, and what technological capabilities, on the part of firms, are both possible and profitable to learn. Then competitiveness depends on investing heavily in learning.
The risk of pressing ahead with an integrated iron and steel mill-at $3.6 billion, Korea's largest single investment to date -was assumed entirely by the state. POSCO has been a stateowned enterprise, although privatization is probably on the agenda. Not only the first integrated iron and steel complex in Korea, but also the second, is under POSCO's management, challenging the now fashionable view that state enterprise is invariably inefficient. POSCO represents a microcosm of Korean public policy in two respects: It is both supporter and disciplinarian of the private companies that patronize it. It is a supporter insofar as it provides high-quality steel at low prices. It is a disciplinarian insofar as it serves as a standard of an excellently managed enterprise. That POSCO itself is excellently managed may reflect the industrial environment in which it operates: most of the bigger businesses in Korea are also well managed, at least in the production and operations management sense. There may be a general tendency for public enterprises to mirror the management standards of the private sector at large.
Generally, creating competitive advantage through learning rather than innovation is less risky because the learner has both a model and a teacher to guide it. In POSCO's case, its model and its teacher was the Nippon Steel Company of Japan (which also commenced life as a state-owned enterprise). Yet creating advantage through learning is tenuous in one respect: The learner faces more competition than the innovator. The innovator protects its competitive position with a new product or low-cost process. The learner has nothing to protect it but lower wages, and these become increasingly insignificant as a competitive weapon the more skill and capital intensive the sector. The creation of competitiveness in steel was a watershed in Korean industrial history because it represented a major sector in which competitiveness depended on higher productivity (not lower wages) in a struggle against PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: HINARI; date: 29 November 2018 experienced producers from more (not (p.293) less) advanced countries. In POSCO's case, its model and teacher was also its major competitor, the formidable Japanese steelproducing giants.
The fight to raise productivity in the Korean steel industry is the subject of this chapter.
POSCO's Founding
The government created the Pohang Iron and Steel Company, Ltd., in 1968; five years later POSCO began production in the southwest city of Pohang with an annual capacity of 1.03 million metric tons. After several expansions (in a total of four phases, with the last phase divided into two stages), the mill reached an annual capacity of 9.1 million metric tons of crude steel in 1983 (see Table 12 .1). Because steel is liberally consumed by industries such as shipbuilding, automobiles, and construction, the founding of POSCO signaled Korea's turn to heavy industry.
The history of the Korean steel industry dates back to 1941 when Japan established two steel mills in southern Korea as a way to support its war efforts in China and Manchuria. These mills were severely damaged during the Korean War (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) , so that until the late 1960s the industry comprised roughly 109 facilities-predominantly rolling mills, several steel-making minimills, and a few iron-making installations. Most of these firms suffered from obsolete plants and equipment. According to a 1967 study prepared for the prime minister by the Office of Planning and Coordination, of a total of thirty-seven steel-making furnaces (mostly electric), thirtyone were outmoded (dating to the 1940s), six were modern (dating to the 1950s), and none was contemporary (dating to the 1960s) (Korea Advanced Institute of Science, 1976) . Furthermore, even though there were three small blast furnaces in existence (60 cubic meters in size compared with 1,660 cubic meters in POSCO's first phase), due to accidents and mismanagement none was operating. Quality was poor, and there was a market imbalance between the steel shapes that were being supplied and those that were being demanded.
Therefore, when the government set about founding an integrated iron and steel works, it chose not to build on any existing structure (although many experienced steel workers were later recruited by POSCO). Instead, the government founded POSCO as a wholly new entity. The government's failure to assign steel-making to one of the emerging chaebol remains a mystery. Some say it was because no chaebol was willing at the time to undertake the risk involved (although later the top business groups lobbied hard for the rights to POSCO's second integrated facility at Kwangyang in 1986). (p.294) PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com Construction of Pohang began on April 1, 1970, and the plant was dedicated on July 3, 1973, two months before the first worldwide energy crisis.
Profitability and Subsidization
According to a report by PaineWebber directed to the American financial community, POSCO was a profitable venture from the beginning of its operations:
Quite remarkable is the fact that POSCO has been profitable every year since it began production in 1973. In fact, in recent years, the company has had to resort to the use of accelerated depreciation and other accounting conventions to hold down reported profits. . . . This profit record is all the more remarkable when considering.
-Major start-up and training costs have been incurred over this period.
-POSCO has provided steel at bargain price levels to both its domestic and foreign customers (1985, pp. 1-2).
Three factors appear to have underscored POSCO's apparent profitability:
1. Korea's labor costs per ton shipped were lower than those of any major competitor. In 1973, labor costs per ton shipped of hot-rolled product were $7.06 at POSCO, $23.83 in Japan, $27.06 in the United Kingdom, $32.86 in Germany, and $37.83 in the United States (PaineWebber, 1985) . Obviously POSCO's advantage largely reflected its far lower wage rates. Furthermore, over time, increases in POSCO's labor productivity (which will be discussed shortly) offset increases in its wage rates, enabling the fledgling firm to keep labor costs per ton shipped more or less constant. 3. POSCO's profitability was shored up by government subsidization of costs of capital and investments in infrastructure-roads, harbors, and electricity generation. According to the Korea Advanced Institute of Science (KAIS), the Korean government supported the establishment of POSCO through various measures, as enacted in the Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law of January 1, 1970. It provided POSCO with access to long-term low-interest foreign capital for the purchase of equipment and for the erection of a port building, water supply facilities, an electricitygeneration station, roads, and a railroad line. Korea's electricity charges are among the highest in the world, but POSCO is self-sufficient in 80% of its electricity requirements. The government also provided POSCO with discounted user rates for many government services, such as a discounted railroad rate of 40%, port rate of 50%, water-supply rate of 30%, and gas rate of 20%. KAIS has estimated that the government spent a minimum of 13.3 billion won ($42 million at the nominal 1970 exchange rate) just for the "massive 
(p.298) The Competition
International cost comparisons of efficient integrated steel mills for both hot-and cold-rolled steel (POSCO's major products are hot rolled) show POSCO's total costs running neck and neck with those of Japan and of West Germany (see Figure 12 .1 and Table 12 .2). Figure 12 .1 indicates that throughout the period 1973-1984, the margin of cost differences between POSCO, West Germany, and Japan was negligible. Table 12 .2 gives a detailed breakdown of costs as well as input prices for cold-rolled coil in the integrated steel mills of five countries in 1984. In this case, Korea's costs are slightly above those of Japan (due, in part, to the short-run movement of exchange rates).
The explanations for cost differences between Japan and Korea in cold-rolled coil may be grouped into two sets: those related to finance (depreciation, interest, and taxes) and those related to prices, yields, and productivity. 4 Turning to the second set of explanations, the degree to which Japan's competitiveness depends on productivity and on yields, rather than on factor prices, may be inferred from the data presented in Table 12 .2. As this table suggests, the prices of two inputs, iron and coal, are roughly the same per ton in Japan and Korea. Yet the costs of iron ore and coal per ton of steel are lower in Japan, suggesting higher yields. Similarly, labor productivity is higher in Japan: Wages are about four times greater in Japan than in Korea, but labor costs per ton of steel are only 2.5 times greater. Table 12 .3 presents efficiency measures corresponding to the data in Table 12 .2. As suggested by asymmetrical differences in wage rates and wage costs, labor hours per ton of steel are lower in Japan. The most common measure of overall yield, final product per unit of crude steel, is also higher.
The monetary magnitudes associated with variations in yields in the steel industry can be illustrated with a simple example, using data from Table 12 .2 and focusing on the overall yield of final product per unit of crude steel. Assume that the value of a lost unit of final product represents a lost sale. 5 Assume that the value of a lost sale is equal (conservatively) to the unit costs of the least efficient producer. The least efficient producer in Table 12 .2 is the United States, with unit costs of $442. In the case of a company like POSCO, therefore, with an annual capacity of 9.1 million tons, a 1% increase (p.301) in yield raises output by 91,000 tons. At a "price" of $442 per ton, a 1% improvement in yield offsets a loss in revenue by $40.1 million-not an inconsequential saving.
Ignoring finance-related costs, the fact that Japan has defended its market share in the steel industry on the basis of superior productivity and yields has forced POSCO to invest in human and material capital to keep pace with Japan's technological progress. As will be discussed shortly, yields depend on labor skills, on process engineering, and on both the age of capital equipment and the vintage of technology embodied in it. Accordingly, POSCO has religiously reinvested its profits to upgrade its capital stock-prompting the acquisition of investment capability-and it has emphasized labor training and process improvements. In so doing it has embarked on a learning trajectory different from those of the labor-intensive industries (e.g., textiles) that preceded it.
POSCO has competed in both the international and domestic markets against steel from the integrated mills of the advanced countries as well as from Brazil and Taiwan. In the case of steel sold to local consumers who will market their final product domestically, imports are subject to a 25% duty. However, Korean steel consumers receive duty drawbacks if they reexport the imported steel in a more processed form (such consumers include numerous minimills, which account for roughly 35% of Korea's steel output and a sizeable share of POSCO's shipments). In the case of its minimill market, POSCO faces direct competition from abroad because it enjoys no tariff protection. A 1983 study of hot-rolled steel and its end users indicated that 26.5% of hot-rolled product was exported, 39.5% was sold to local consumers that were eligible for duty drawbacks, and only 34% was sold to consumers that would have had to pay a 25% duty had they imported steel (PaineWebber, 1985) .
Despite excess home demand for steel throughout most of its history, POSCO has exported in order to accomplish the following: Ensure long runs and full-capacity utilization for all types of steel, earn hard currency to repay its foreign debt, take advantage of the government's export subsidies, and drive a stake in the international market in anticipation of future capacity expansions. POSCO has set itself an export target of 30%. In 1974 and 1975, however, when production was first getting under way, and then again in 1982, its ratio of exports to total shipments exceeded 40%; its major export markets are Japan and the United States.
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(p.302) Foreign Technical Assistance and the Nature of
Steel-Making Technology
For the initial installation of Pohang, POSCO imported technology related not only to investment capability (preinvestment feasibility studies, manpower training, project execution), but also to production capability (process engineering, production control). The Japan Group provided both preliminary and master engineering reports, although POSCO had enough experience from earlier failures in project proposals to write the project plan. living in Japan to review the work of both BHP and the Japan Group (Korea Advanced Institute of Science, 1976).
POSCO ordered sixteen plants with facilities to cover the full spectrum of integrated steel mill activity. A railway system within the plant was even included. All contracts but one were given to Japanese companies (the exception was a hot-rolling plate mill awarded to Voest-Alpine, an Austrian firm.) Plant exporters supplied credit and were responsible for basic design and start-up in accordance with the Japan Group's master engineering plan. Plant exporters were also responsible for civil engineering and building construction designs. The Japan Group, however, instructed POSCO in process engineering for each plant and in overall inventory management, production scheduling, and maintenance. It also supervised all construction, POSCO being responsible only for the actual physical labor involved. In short, the initial installation was accomplished almost entirely on a turnkey basis.
The distinguishing characteristic of this turnkey transfer was the degree to which POSCO actively participated in it. POSCO engineers worked closely with their counterparts in the Japan Group-learning what was being taught to them, assimilating what was not being taught to them directly. The single most distinct feature of this participation was the dispatch of a large number of engineers and front-line supervisors for overseas training. Even before operations had commenced, 597 POSCO personnel had received training on or off the job in Japan and Austria in a total of eleven fields, among them iron-making and steel-making. This afforded a tremendous accumulation of experience and know-how and set a precedent for overseas training that continues today (see Table 8 By all accounts, the first technology transfer was successful, a tribute to both the students and teachers involved. When operations finally started-the first molten iron poured forth on June 9, 1973-they did so smoothly, and within a short amount of time showed considerable improvement. The operating rate (production divided by rated capacity) for the last half of 1973 was 44.5%, or roughly 90% if prorated over the entire year. In 1974 it reached 114%, indicating that rated capacity had been exceeded. The operating rate of the first basic oxygen furnace (BOF) was 44% in 1973 and 112% in 1974. The first blast furnace produced 0.67 ton/day/cubic meter within one month of operation; within six months its output had more than doubled to 1.58 T/D/m 3 (see Figure 12. 2). Phase I presented a challenge even after start-up because of the large number of stages in the process flow. POSCO had to learn how to operate a sintering plant, a coke oven, a blast furnace, a basic oxygen furnace, an ingot-casting facility, and a plate mill (see Table 12 .1). Each stage demanded a different set of technical skills. Overall productivity depended on the following: the correct mixture and quality of raw materials, the balancing of capacities, the scheduling of material flows, and the relieving of bottlenecks.
In phase II POSCO added a larger sintering plant, more coke ovens, a bigger blast furnace, a basic oxygen furnace, and for the first time, continuous casting and a cold-strip mill. Most facilities were enlarged still further in phase III-and the larger the facility, the more difficult the process control. Continuous casting capacity was not expanded, but a wire rod mill, a silicon steel mill, and a billet mill were added for the first time. Again, in phase IV continuous casting and cold-strip capacity were increased, and in the second stage of phase IV all major facilities were stripped and relined (with Japanese technical assistance).
Along with its process changes, POSCO's product mix grew more sophisticated. In addition to hot-rolled strip products, POSCO added wire rod, plate, billet, electrical, and cold-rolled and galvanized steel sheets. In 1985, about 4% of the value of the products that POSCO sold could be described as high grade (wire rope, high-carbon steels, railroad rails, and silicon steel). In addition, 7% could be called special steels. These require a higher level of process engineering and quality control than do basic steels. However, local demand for such steels is limited; according to POSCO this is the reason that higher grade steels do not comprise a larger percentage of total output.
Prioritization
From the time of the founding of POSCO to the time of the second energy crisis (1978) (1979) ), POSCO's priority was to increase volume, given excess demand for steel in the home market. It did this by increasing productivity and yields and by expanding capacity. After (p.305) the second oil crisis, while capacity continued to expand priority emphasis shifted to improving product quality and introducing new products. In the discussion that follows, POSCO's learning is described in two sections because it falls into two periods.
Productivity and Yields
To raise productivity (both labor and capital), POSCO attempted to minimize downtime, stabilize operations, and improve the performance of each piece of equipment. To minimize downtime POSCO adopted preventive maintenance of equipment. Stable operations depended on joint effort, and thus it worked at improving a broad set of skills. The degree to which operations were stabilized may be inferred from data on operating rates. Because a high operating rate suggests control over a process (at least enough control to prevent output from slipping below a specified level), the higher the operating rate the more stable the operation. Operating rates suggest a repetitive cycle of improvement, addition of new capacity, improvement, and so on. After POSCO added new capacity, operating rates tended to exceed rated capacity, indicating an above-average degree of process control (PaineWebber, 1985) .
These early attempts at process control were not aided by computerized process-monitoring control systems. Despite the fairly widespread use of such systems in modern integrated steel mills in other countries, POSCO decided against their introduction in its first two phases of expansion. process computers introduced generally. As for business computers, they didn't appear until 1974. They were introduced in production control functions beginning in 1975, but a decade later POSCO was still involved in "totalizing" its computer system.
To improve the performance of each piece of equipment, POSCO provided training to its workers. As suggested in Table  8 .9, the amount of training that POSCO has provided to all grades of employees is extraordinary. Between 1968 and 1979, training courses of one form or another involved roughly 61,400 workers. Approximately 4,200 people were trained outside the company, 1,513 overseas. In 1984 alone, 9,900 workers had received training, some 1,000 of them in computer applications. POSCO also runs technical training schools (p.306) in the town of Pohang, and in 1986 it established an engineering college that it hopes will evolve along the lines of MIT.
The significant improvement of labor productivity over time is depicted in Figure 12 
1984.
7 Therefore, despite Japanese gains, the gap in labor productivity between Korea and Japan has narrowed (PaineWebber, 1985) . Total factor productivity growth is difficult to estimate for POSCO because of measurement problems with capital (as mentioned earlier, POSCO artificially increased the value of its capital stock in 1982 to take advantage of accelerated depreciation). To illustrate the extent to which capital productivity has increased in conjunction with labor productivity, adjusted estimates of capital per unit of output are plotted against labor per unit of output over time (Figure 12.4) . The closer the plots lie to the origin, the better both productivities. Figure 12 .4 shows that the capital/output ratio was relatively low in 1973-1976, rose in 1977-1980 (with new investments in capital equipment), and then returned to its lower level in 1981. Over the whole period, the labor/output ratio generally declined.
To raise yields, POSCO concentrated on reducing rejects (as will be discussed shortly) and increasing the quantity and quality of continuous casting. In the belief that continuous casting was technically too difficult to operate at the start, it was not introduced until phase II. Then it was omitted in phase III and expanded only in phase IV, after the phase II operation had proved successful (Kwangyang will use 100% continuous casting). By 1985, POSCO was right on target: It had attained the expected yield of final steel product to crude steel (88.5%) given its continuous casting ratio (51.3%).
To meet rising demand at home (and to continue to serve the export market at a 30% target), POSCO expanded capacity, first at Pohang and then, beginning in 1985, at Kwangyang (another small village chosen as a steel mill site because of its good harbor). Foreign technical assistance continued through all four phases at Pohang. But POSCO progressively import substituted all the elements of investment capability initially supplied by the Japan Group. As percents of incremental output, foreign engineering fees and labor hours declined steeply over the four phases (see The Japan Group, however, reviewed all of POSCO's engineering work both during this phase and through phase III.
In phase III, the extent of local participation in project execution became even larger, although the master engineering plan continued to be the responsibility of the Japan Group. The Japan Group also assisted POSCO in establishing its computerized process-monitoring control system. New contracts with foreign consultants were entered into for specialty steels and for more advanced training. However, POSCO undertook all remaining engineering tasks itself. By the time of phase IV, the Japan Group's only function was to evaluate POSCO's own master engineering plan.
The technical assistance that POSCO has received for its Kwangyang mill has also been massive, but with two new twists. Most technology has come from Europe, Japanese steel makers being increasingly reluctant to transfer know-how to their erstwhile student. Most assistance has also been provided by plant exporters, and with the exception of evaluation, POSCO has executed all the tasks previously undertaken by the Japan Group (in addition to financing two thirds of the new mill with retained earnings). Within little over a decade, therefore, it can be said that POSCO learned enough and earned enough to reproduce itself.
Quality
In its second stage of learning (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) , competing against a high-wage country like Japan took on a new dimension for POSCO. On the one hand, both an excess supply of steel in the world market and tighter measures to conserve the use of energy made customers' (p.310) quality requirements far stricter than international standards hitherto existing. On the other hand, Japanese steel mills began to engage in what POSCO called quality dumping, or raising quality while keeping the price of steel constant. To compete, POSCO had to increase the quality of its products.
According to Sang Bok Hong, manager of POSCO's Quality Control Department, there was "not one word in the contract with the Japan Group about quality, although quality is the heart of steel-making know-how." This did not mean that the Japan Group provided POSCO with no quality control knowhow whatsoever-it taught POSCO about quality indirectly, by teaching it how to make steel that met international standards. What Hong meant was that there were no quality guarantees in the contract and no explicit stipulation about instruction in how to improve quality.
Training apart, POSCO placed quality on its own agenda as early as 1973 when quality control circles were formed at the outset of operations. POSCO also established a quality control (QC) department, which functioned in practice, and launched a Zero Defect campaign, which existed in theory. The job of the QC department was sevenfold: systems analysis, laboratory work, mechanical testing, product design, investigation of the chemical and mechanical properties of different steels, monitoring of quality results across departments (steelmaking, iron-making, etc.), and evaluation of quality. POSCO had not systematically collected data on reject rates until 1976, but in 1979 quality began to receive far more attention. Statistical quality control was furthered by the introduction of process computers, and investments in more sophisticated equipment enabled better testing and inspection. The Zero Defect campaign began to be taken seriously, and selected people were sent to Japan to learn more about the movement. POSCO workers began to be paid for suggestions that reduced defects.
By 1977 POSCO had as yet undertaken no R&D. Technical problems were solved either by the QC department, by technosections within production departments (to be discussed shortly), or by the Japan Group. Spurred by the second energy crisis and the need to introduce process and product improvements to reduce energy requirements, an R&D center was established in 1977. R&D expenditures between 1977 and 1986 averaged 0.70% of sales (or roughly 16.2 million dollars in 1985 when sales equaled $2.3 billion).
In 1985 R&D employed 260 people: 148 researchers (12 with PhD's) and 112 technicians. The POSCO R&D department generally sets its own research agenda but also works on projects proposed to it by production departments. Major projects have included making the blast furnace an oil-free operation, reducing the consumption of refractories (p.311) for steel-making, and improving the tundish for continuous casting. The R&D center's own agenda aims to consolidate between 1991 and 1996, and to create new technology between 1996 and the year 2000.
New product introduction thus has involved the QC department, R&D, and technosections within production departments. Of the total of 432 steel grades that POSCO is aiming to establish as its fully conceivable product spectrum, 399, or 92.4%, were already being produced in 1986. An examination of quality measures of selected POSCO products makes possible the placement of an upper bound on the firm's technological attainments because its latest technological effort concerned quality. Both external and internal sources of information on quality were utilized: interviews with users of POSCO steel conducted by Mitsubishi Research Institute (MRI) and reject rates from POSCO itself. The two sources correspond fairly closely and show a mixed picture: quality equal to Japan's for some products but not others, and variations in quality along different dimensions for products whose quality is not yet under control.
The MRI survey results are presented in Table 12 .5. According to users interviewed by MRI, Korean wire rod was equal in quality to Japanese wire rod. Figure 12 .5, which presents POSCO's data on reject rates for wire rod, confirms the achievement over time of a defect rate that approximates zero. By contrast, user interviews suggest quality problems for plate, hot coil, and cold coil. The nature of steel-making technology helped POSCO organize production without the group-level administrative support that the operating units of the chaebol enjoyed. While technological complexity characterizes the internal process flow of steelmaking, the external linkages between steel-makers and feeder firms are relatively few. By comparison with, say, shipbuilding or automobile manufacture, steel-making depends on few supplier relationships. Steel production is dependent on tight internal coordination but not on the timely arrival of parts and components from multiple vendors. To make steel, POSCO has had to purchase raw materials, market its final product, and execute approximately 425 jobs. In each case, POSCO has taken steps to simplify its organizational exposure. It has formed a joint venture with a coal-mining firm in the United States to ensure a steady supply of raw material, although this investment probably has not been cost effective. It has distributed its own steel domestically but has relied on the general trading companies of the chaebol for overseas distribution. To reduce internal transactions it has subcontracted roughly 8,700 lower skilled jobs (as discussed in Chapter 8). By comparison with many of the operating units of the chaebol, therefore, POSCO has enjoyed relative organizational insularity.
Even more than the chaebol, however, POSCO was confronted initially with the task of building an organization of committed workers and managers. The argument that it has succeeded in doing so is lent support by its low turnover rates. As Chapter 8 noted, turnover for all POSCO employees due to quit rates fell from 4.4% in 1977 to 1.7% in 1980 and to a mere 1.2% in 1984 1.2% in (PaineWebber, 1985 . These quit rates are well below the all-manufacturing average for Korean industry. POSCO, however, has not created (p.315) commitment by playing up the fact of its public ownership. To the contrary-most POSCO managers denied that the company was even a state enterprise. In fact, POSCO's status is both quasi-governmental and private in orientation. The company is a closed corporation and its stock is not traded on any exchange. Currently POSCO's ownership is held 30% by the government, 40% by the Korea Development Bank (government owned), and 30% by private commercial banks (which, however, are government controlled). Government approval is required on all management appointments and top policy management. creation of a team of committed managers was aided by the educated unemployment that existed at the time, and POSCO workers are highly paid by Korean standards.
Nevertheless, although POSCO exploited its technology in a way that allowed it to operate outside the protective umbrella of a big business group, it organized production in the same way as the leading chaebol, which used a strategy that allowed them to compensate for their status as inexperienced learners: They gave power to managers directly involved in production.
The twenty-seven different facilities that POSCO had to manage in phase I and the multiple stages in the process flow that had to be stabilized put a tremendous strain on an evolving management team that included newly returned trainees from overseas. To overcome these organizational weaknesses, POSCO gave a lot of power to the line. Each plant manager of a new facility was appointed as a counterpart to the corresponding consultant from the Japan Group, and worked closely with the responsible machinery supplier as well. The plant manager did overall planning and also participated in procurement, specification, construction management, test operation, and start-up. He (all managers are males), therefore had a total familiarity with the process of his plant at the outset of production. In the initial phases of growth, moreover, the best people were assigned to the line. Even shift foremen were experienced engineers with college degrees. Additionally, POSCO emphasized on-the-job operations training for all its technical managers. Newly recruited engineers with university backgrounds were required to work on all three shifts in order to become familiar with every operation. On-the-job training in steel-making lasted for six months; in iron-making it lasted for one year. The staff of the quality control department had to work in the plant for three months.
Only gradually were engineers gathered into centralized departments: a master engineering planning department, a construction department, an R&D center, and others. But greater centralization notwithstanding, each production department retained its own fifteen-to (p.316) twentyengineer "technosections." These technosections were important because they embodied a cross section of production and investment capability. Production capability was derived from providing technical assistance to operations managers; investment capability was derived from working Cross-Subsidization When Y. S. Chough, the first plant manager of POSCO's number one blast furnace, was asked how POSCO managers learned to make steel, he responded:
Total devotion. There were a lot of educated unemployed, and everyone wanted to learn. To learn, I had to make everything clear in every detail. We had to be in a position of preparedness to encounter the unknown. It was no use if information was known only to me. We had to concentrate everyone to one point. I always gave them tasks, homework. We would meet with the Japan Group. Then we would have a meeting of Koreans until late at night.
Determination alone, however, did not overcome the lack of capital, raw materials, markets, skills, and technology necessary to make steel. The planning that created Korea's comparative advantage in steel took two forms, both of which transcended market forces: political intervention by the government and a long-run approach to profit maximization by POSCO.
Political intervention by the government occurred in two market contexts: (1) The government intervened to raise capital. After failing to raise capital of the desired sum in the international market, the government arranged capital in political horse-trading with Japan. (2) The government intervened in POSCO's product market by a growth strategy that ensured a high level of home demand for steel. Although exports were encouraged, steel was primarily an importsubstitution industry. Therefore, to ensure sufficient home demand to realize the ambitious scale at which the government wished POSCO to operate, a Big Push was necessary into the steel-consuming industries. This Big Push was a major source of government assistance to POSCO.
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(p.317) In turn, fast growth created a stimulating environment in which to learn. It made possible two types of learning-by-doing: one associated with the acquisition of investment capability and the other associated with the acquisition of production capability. High demand allowed POSCO to run "full and steady," and steady made the acquisition of production-related skills more straightforward. Rising demand also enabled POSCO to undertake capacity expansions in rapid succession, thereby accelerating the acquisition of project execution skills and technological knowledge of the steel-making process. Finally, rising demand and the prospect of establishing a second integrated steel complex provided the government with a measure of discipline over POSCO managers. Every manager queried stated the pressure he felt to perform well in order to secure the contract for the second steel mill and the possibility of a promotion.
As POSCO expanded, it in turn increased the demand for the products of upstream industries. Its demand was of two types: it needed consumables for day-to-day operation (for example, refractories, spare parts, and abrasives), it needed capital goods. Thus, POSCO could meet government requirements for higher local content in consumption for capacity expansions. In 1977 POSCO bought about 44% of its consumables from local suppliers. By 1984 this figure had risen to 75%. The percentage of capital goods purchased locally for capacity expansions (ratio of localization) has also increased steadily over time. During the course of Pohang's four growth phases, the localization ratio rose from 12.5% to 15.5% to 22.6% to 35.1%. For the two phases of Kwangyang, the ratios are currently expected to be 50% and 56%, respectively. Furthermore, with each capacity expansion, local firms supplied more complex capital goods. In phase I of Pohang, local firms supplied simple materials; in phase II, steel structures; in phase III, single elements of equipment; in phase IV, unit facilities (power-receiving and distribution facilities and unloaders). In phase I of Kwangyang, local capital goods suppliers are building auxiliary plants (a powergenerating plant and an automated warehouse). In phase II they are reaching the point of supplying major plants (a raw materials handling plant, a sintering plant).
Government subsidization of electricity afforded POSCO a cost advantage relative to minimills, and POSCO, in turn, subsidized minimills by providing them with steel at prices below those prevailing internationally (with the exception of the European "spot" market). According to PaineWebber (1985) , the August 1985 price of hot-rolled coil in South Korea for domestic usage was $264 per metric ton. In comparison, the August 1985 "spot" price of hot-rolled coil was $342 per ton in the United States (list price was $524 per (p.318) ton), $285 per ton in Europe at the French/German border, $346 in East Canada, and $358 for "big buyers" in Japan.
PRINTED POSCO's technique for mediating market forces and creating competitive advantage in the labor market took the form of paying wage rates well above the going norm, thus accelerating the advent of a skill base also well above average. In the market for technology, foreign know-how at POSCO was rapidly supplanted by in-house investments in skill. Conceived in violation of static comparative advantage, the company might have followed an alternative path-acquiring production, investment, and innovation capability separately, in linear progression, the easiest first and the most difficult last, in a chain of static comparative advantage defined for different skill elements of a single product, analogous to one that is typically defined for many products. Instead, POSCO invested in acquiring different elements of steel-making skill more or less simultaneously. Linearity was present to the extent that POSCO first began to learn how to make steel, then how to expand steel-making capacity, and lastly how to innovate new steel products and processes. But the acquisition of investment and production capability occurred almost simultaneously. Indeed, certain elements of investment capability were acquired before POSCO turned attention to fine tuning its production skills. (Chandler, 1989) . By historical standards, POSCO's learning has been less of a linear progression than a broad, frontal sweep.
Notes:
(1) Much has been made of POSCO's militarylike qualities-its strong leadership, the discipline and regimentation of its workers, and so on. Nonetheless, although Korea's military may be assumed to keep a sharp eye on the country's only integrated iron-and steel-making capacity, POSCO has no stronger leadership or greater worker regimentation than some of the chaebol. Moreover, the internal organization of POSCO is not drawn along administrative lines that are generally associated with the military (see Mintzburg, 1979) . Rather, POSCO's organization is said to reflect that of its mentor, the Nippon Steel Company of Japan.
